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    n the summer of 2012, an American platoon was patrolling in the village 
of Sarenzai, Zhari district, Afghanistan. They stopped in the village and set 
up a security perimeter when they noticed a man they did not recognize. 
After stopping and questioning him, they used a device called the Secure 
Electronic Enrollment Kit (SEEK) to capture the man’s biometrics. The 
SEEK compared the digital fingerprints of the man to stored data. It showed 
that the man was the second most wanted Taliban in southern Afghanistan.1  
This example shows why armed forces are increasingly adopting biomet-
rics. It is a way in which persons, including enemy personnel, can be identi-
fied quickly and authoritatively—a capability considered important by armed 
forces. On the modern battlefield, parties to armed conflicts often rely on 
anonymity. This is particularly the case for terrorist groups. Biometrics can 
be a powerful tool to deny that anonymity.   
Therefore, it is no surprise that biometrics has been used in recent con-
flicts, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the United States mil-
itary is still the principal military user of the technology, it is increasingly 
being adopted by other States’ armed forces.  
Important questions in relation to the use of biometrics by armed forces 
concern the legal framework that governs such use. During armed conflict, 
that legal framework consists mainly of international humanitarian law 
(IHL). The main IHL treaties, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and two 
1977 Additional Protocols, were adopted before this new technology began 
to be used by armed forces. Does this mean that IHL does not regulate the 
use of biometrics at all? Is there a need for the drafting of new rules that 
govern biometrics? Or are the existing rules of IHL sufficiently technologi-
cally neutral to allow application to this new technology?  
This article will investigate the relationship between IHL and biometrics 
in an attempt to answer these questions. In order to do so, it will first provide 
a description of biometrics (Part II) and its use during armed conflict (Part 
III). This is followed by a discussion of the application of the duty to review 
new methods and means of warfare in Article 36 of Additional Protocol I2 
 
1. ANNIE JACOBSEN, FIRST PLATOON: A STORY OF MODERN WAR IN THE AGE OF 
IDENTITY DOMINANCE 6–8 (2021). 
2. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 36, June 8, 1977, 1125 













(AP I) to biometrics (Part IV). The remainder of the article is structured on 
the basis of different activities carried out during armed conflict in which 
biometrics can play a role: targeting (Part V), detention (Part VI), identifying 
the missing and the dead (Part VII), and enforcement of IHL (Part VIII). 
The article concludes with a number of final remarks.     
This article will not address the issue of protection of biometric data 
under IHL. That issue is part of a larger debate on the legal regime for pro-
tecting data, including, but not limited to, biometric data during armed con-
flict.3 As such, it is outside the scope of this article. The article will also not 
examine the application of other legal regimes, such as international human 
rights law. These other regimes may also be relevant to the use of biometrics 
by armed forces, including during armed conflict,4 but are beyond the scope 
of this article. In the case of concurrent application of these regimes and 
IHL, the issue of the interrelationship between the different regimes will be-
come an issue.5 
 
II. WHAT IS BIOMETRICS? 
 
“Biometrics” or “biometric recognition” is defined as the “automated recog-
nition of individuals based on their biological and behavioural characteris-
tics.”6 It uses the physical, physiological, or behavioral characteristics of in-
dividuals to recognize them.7 Examples of such characteristics are face to-
pography, hand topography, finger topography, iris structure, vein structure 
of the hand, voice, gait, and DNA.8 These characteristics are unique, which 
makes them very suitable for identifying persons.9 
 
3. Robin Geiß & Henning Lahmann, Protection of Data in Armed Conflict, 97 INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW STUDIES 556 (2021). 
4. See, e.g., William H. Boothby, Biometrics, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW IN 
WAR AND PEACE 392, 406–14 (William H. Boothby ed., 2019). 
5. On the interrelationship between IHL and international human rights law generally, 
see Terry Gill, Some Thoughts on the Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Inter-
national Human Rights Law: A Plea for Mutual Respect and a Common-sense Approach, 16 YEAR-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 251 (2013). 
6. Information Technology – Vocabulary – Part 37: Biometrics, ISO/IEC DIS 2382-37, ISO, 
https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:2382:-37:dis:ed-3:v1:en (last visited Oct. 5, 
2021) [hereinafter, ISO/IEC DIS 2382-37]. 
7. For an extensive description of biometrics, see, e.g., NANCY Y. LIU, BIO-PRIVACY: 
PRIVACY REGULATIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF BIOMETRICS 29–59 (2012).  
8. For additional characteristics, see Boothby, supra note 4, at 192.  












A “biometric system” is defined as a “system for the purpose of the bi-
ometric recognition of individuals based on their behavioural and biological 
characteristics.”10 It is essentially a pattern recognition system that operates 
by acquiring biometric data from an individual, extracting a feature set from 
the acquired data, and comparing this feature set against the template set in 
the database.11  
A biometric system can be used for verification or identification. Verifi-
cation refers to validating a person’s identity by comparing the captured bi-
ometric data with their own biometric template(s) stored in the system data-
base.12 This is a one-to-one process that answers the question of whether the 
person concerned is who they claim to be. Identification refers to recogniz-
ing an individual by searching the templates of all the users in the database 
for a match.13 Identification is a one-to-many comparison to establish an 
individual’s identity without the person concerned having to claim an iden-
tity.  
A biometric system is an automated process that includes the following 
steps: 
i) Biometric data is collected (sometimes this is also referred to as “cap-
ture” or “enrollment”) from an individual via a biometric identification de-
vice, such as an image scanner for fingerprints or palm vein patterns or a 
camera to collect facial and iris scans. The data can be captured either directly 
from the individual or from an object.14 An example of the latter would be a 
fingerprint left on an object by the individual.  
ii) The system extracts the data from the submitted sample. 
iii) It compares the scanned data from those captured for reference. 
iv) It matches the submitted sample with templates. 
v) It determines or verifies whether the identity of the biometric data 
holder is authentic.15 
Biometric technologies, therefore, consist of both hardware and soft-
ware. A biometric identification device is hardware that collects, reads, and 
compares biometric data. Biometric data is a sample taken from an individual 
 
10. ISO/IEC DIS 2382-37, supra note 6. 
11. Anil Jain, Arun Ross & Salil Prabhakar, An Introduction to Biometric Recognition, 14 
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS FOR VIDEO TECHNOLOGY 4, 5 (2004). 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 6. 
14. For more detail, see WILLIAM BUHROW, BIOMETRICS IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY 
OPERATIONS: LESSONS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD 11–14 (2017).  
15. Rawlson King, What are Biometrics?, BIOMETRIC UPDATE.COM, https://www.bio-











that is unique to that individual. Software is used to process gathered bio-
metric data.16 The software typically works with the hardware to operate the 
biometric data capture process, extract the data, and undertake comparison, 
including data matching.17 
Various biometric characteristics exist and are used in biometric systems. 
Some of them are mentioned above. Each has its own advantages and draw-
backs in general and in the context of military applications.18 For instance, 
some characteristics are more permanent than others. Facial features, for ex-
ample, will change over time as a person grows older, while DNA will remain 
the same. Another relevant difference between modalities is collectability. 
Some characteristics are more difficult to collect than others. For example, 
it is easier to take a picture of someone’s face than to take fingerprints of 
each of their ten fingers. Most biometric systems presently employed in the 
military domain use a single biometric characteristic to establish identity. 
There are also systems that integrate the evidence presented by multiple 
sources of information. These are called multimodal biometric systems be-
cause they use more than one characteristic or mode. 
Biometric systems vary in how close a person must be for it to be possi-
ble to enroll that person biometrically. Traditionally, systems need to be close 
to the person or even in physical contact with the person so that enrollment 
is difficult without that person’s knowledge. However, technologies that can 
enroll biometric data remotely are being developed or have already been de-
veloped. According to William Buhrow, from the perspective of combat op-
erations, there will be a move towards biometric systems that provide better 
standoff distance between sensor and target.19 It was reported in May 2021 
that the United States Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, an 
organization that falls under the Office of the Director of National Intelli-
gence, has a program called Biometric Recognition and Identification at Al-




18. For a discussion of some relevant differences, see BUHROW, supra note 14, at 127–
29. 
19. Id. at 75. 
20. Jon Harper, Shadow Warriors Pursuing Next-gen Surveillance Tech, NATIONAL DEFENSE 
(May 7, 2021), https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/5/7/shadow-
warriors-pursuing-next-gen-surveillance-tech; Zak Doffman, New Pentagon Laser Identifies In-
dividuals by Their Heartbeat, FORBES (June 27, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoff-
man/2019/06/27/u-s-military-laser-can-identify-people-by-their-heartbeats-mit-reports/? 











software systems capable of performing “whole body biometric identifica-
tion from drones and other platforms.”21 It has also been reported that the 
Turkish armed forces have unmanned aerial vehicles capable of facial recog-
nition.22 The drones use facial recognition to detect human targets and can 
autonomously launch fire-and-forget missiles through the entry of target co-
ordinates, it is reported.23 
The use of biometrics offers advantages in comparison to recognition 
systems used previously. In particular, they promise greater accuracy. Bio-
logical and behavioral characteristics used in biometric systems are unique to 
an individual. This means that they allow the recognition of that individual 
with scientific accuracy.24 Another advantage has to do with the fact that a 
biometric system is an automated system. As a result, the process of recog-
nizing an individual can be carried out much faster than if it had to be done 
manually.  
The fact that biometrics promises recognition with scientific accuracy 
does not mean that such systems are infallible. No biometric technique is 
completely accurate. As Anil Jain, Arun Ross, and Salil Prabhakar explain: 
 
Two samples of the same biometric characteristic from the same person 
(e.g., two impressions of a user’s right index finger) are not exactly the same 
due to imperfect imaging conditions (e.g., sensor noise and dry fingers), 
changes in the user’s physiological or behavioral characteristics (e.g., cuts 
and bruises on the finger), ambient conditions (e.g., temperature and hu-
midity), and user’s interaction with the sensor (e.g., finger placement).25  
 
Because no biometric system is perfectly accurate, the response of a bio-
metric matching system typically takes the form of a matching score that 
quantifies the similarity between the input and the template it is compared 
with.26  
An error by a biometric system can take the form of either a false positive 
or a false negative. A false negative refers to an error when the technology 
 
21. Harper, supra note 20. 
22. Luana Pascu, Turkey Adds Autonomous Facial Recognition Kamikaze Drones to Military 
Portfolio, BIOMETRIC UPDATE.COM (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.biometricupdate.com/20 
1911/turkey-adds-autonomous-facial-recognition-kamikaze-drones-to-military-portfolio. 
23. Id. 
24. Alison Mitchell, Distinguishing Friend from Foe: Law and Policy in the Age of Battlefield 
Biometrics, 50 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 289, 297 (2012). 












fails to identify a person already enrolled. A false positive transpires when an 
erroneous match is made, thus misidentifying a person. Some of the limita-
tions of biometric systems using a single mode can be addressed by deploy-
ing biometric systems that integrate the evidence presented by multiple 
sources of information.27 The use of multimodal systems can mitigate the 
risk of false positives but cannot exclude them. 
Finally, the accuracy of a biometric system also depends on the individual 
who operates and maintains it.28 Involuntary or intentional misuse of the 
system may lead to errors. The system’s effectiveness is largely dependent 
on the quality of enrollment carried out by operators in the field. Poor quality 
input will decrease the chances of matching data.29 Despite the fact that a 
biometric system is an automated system, humans play an important role in 
the process of comparing biometric data.  
 
III. THE USE OF BIOMETRICS DURING ARMED CONFLICT 
 
Biometrics was initially developed for civilian applications. Use of the tech-
nology by armed forces is of more recent date.30 The U.S. armed forces have 
been and remain at the forefront of adopting biometrics in military opera-
tions. Other armed forces are following suit, and its use will likely become 
pervasive in the future.31  
This development is illustrated by the way the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO) has approached biometrics. In recent years, NATO has 
identified the need to recognize threat actors and reduce their ability to re-
main anonymous. To this end, biometrics is considered one of the 
 
27. Arun Ross & Anil Jain, Multimodal Biometrics: An Overview, PROCEEDINGS OF 12TH 
EUROPEAN SIGNAL PROCESSING CONFERENCE (EUSIPCO) 1221, 1221 (2004).  
28. Robin Feldman, Considerations on the Emerging Implementation of Biometric Technology, 25 
HASTINGS COMMUNICATIONS AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL 653, 664 (2003).  
29. Air Land and Sea Application Center, ATP 2-22.85, MCRP 3-33.1.J, NTTP 3-07.16, 
AFTTP 3.2.85, CGTTP 3-93.6, Biometrics: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures for Tactical Employment of Biometrics in Support of Operations25–29 (2014), 
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/MCRP%203-33.1J%20BIOMETRICS%201.pdf. 
30. Mitchell, supra note 24, at 292. 
31. In 2012 Mitchell wrote, “[i]n the space of just over ten years, the use of this tool 
has gone from being virtually unknown to being an everyday occurrence.” Id. at 290. This 












organization’s top strategic and operational capabilities.32 Particularly in the 
last decade, NATO and NATO member States have developed both doc-
trine and capabilities in relation to biometrics.33 In 2012, the organization 
adopted a Concept for Biometrics in Support of Operations, which was fol-
lowed by other doctrinal publications elaborating on that concept.34 In 2020, 
NATO announced its own Automated Biometrics Identification System de-
veloped by the NATO Communications and Information Agency.35 
There are a great number of potential applications of biometrics in the 
military domain.36 It can be used throughout the full range of operations, 
including combat operations, security operations, peace support operations, 
and peacetime military engagement. Many of the potential applications are 
relevant to situations of armed conflict in which IHL applies. In general, 
biometrics allows verification of the identity of personnel and identification 
of enemy threats with a high degree of confidence.37 More specifically, pos-
sible applications during situations of armed conflict include, but are not 
limited to: 
(i) Verification of the identity of persons who wish to gain access to mil-
itary facilities: Biometrics can be used to check that persons entering military 
facilities have the proper authorization to do so.38 This application has been 
used by U.S. forces in Iraq, for example.39 
(ii) Identification of persons applying for posts requiring security clear-
ances: Biometrics can assist in identifying persons that will, for example, be 
working closely with friendly forces. One instance of this application was its 
 
32. Mark Lunan, New Doctrinal Concepts: Biometrics, 33 THE THREE SWORDS MAGAZINE 




35. Chris Burt, NATO Announces In-house Biometrics System for Secure Data-sharing, BIO-
METRIC UPDATE.COM (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.biometricupdate.com/202011/nato-
launches-in-house-biometrics-system-for-secure-data-sharing. 
36. See, e.g., BUHROW, supra note 14, at 41–68.  
37. Mitchell, supra note 24, at 295–96.   
38. Boothby, supra note 4, at 396. 
39. Noah Shachtman, Iraq’s Biometric Database Could Become “Hit List”: Army, WIRED 
(Aug. 15, 2007), https://www.wired.com/2007/08/also-two-thirds/; Joshua Steinhauer, 
US Biometric and Identity Intelligence Programme, Part 1: How the American Department of Defense 












use by U.S. armed forces in Afghanistan.40 Another example is the use of 
biometrics by U.S. armed forces to vet local drivers who carry out the sus-
tainment of U.S. forces in Syria.41 
(iii) Identifying persons responsible for the manufacture, transport, and 
placing of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other material used by 
the enemy: Biometrics played an important role in countering IEDs by U.S. 
and other forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.42 Whether detonated or not, when 
an IED is discovered, it can be examined for fingerprints or DNA (latent 
biometric traces). If a fingerprint or DNA is found, it can be scanned, stored, 
and compared with fingerprints or DNA in a database, which may lead to 
identifying a person involved in manufacturing, transporting, or placing the 
IED, and possibly the network of which they form part.43 The recent devel-
opment of so-called “rapid DNA” promises to further stimulate this military 
application of biometrics. Rapid DNA technology is described as making it 
possible “to extract the identifying component within human DNA from all 
kinds of materials in less than two hours, for example from saliva or blood, 
but also from cigarette ends, hairs, skin epithelium and other trace materials 
left behind on [objects].”44 
(iv) Identifying an individual in the context of targeting: Biometrics can 
contribute to identifying persons for the purpose of targeting during various 
phases of the targeting process. It is a particularly reliable way to identify a 
target.  
(v) Identifying persons upon capture and during the detention process: 
Biometrics can help identify who has been captured and ensure the right 
 
40. Department of Defense Biometrics Task Force, Biometrics on the Ground and in the 
DOD, U.S. ARMY (June 1, 2009), https://www.army.mil/article/21940/biometrics_on_ 
the_ground_and_in_the_dod. 
41. Elizabeth Rogers, Soldiers Use Biometrics to Vet Drivers Sustaining Syrian Logistics Ops, 
U.S. ARMY (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.army.mil/article/243454/soldiers_use_bio 
metrics_to_vet_drivers_sustaining_syrian_logistics_ops. 
42. See, e.g., David F. Eisler, Counter-IED Strategy in Modern War, MILITARY REVIEW, 
Jan.-Feb. 2012, at 9, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Ar-
chives/English/militaryreview_20120229_art006.pdf. 
43. See, e.g., NATO, AJP-3.15 (A), Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised 
Explosive Devices (2011), https://www.dtra.mil/Portals/61/Documents/Missions/ 
NATO%20AJP-3.15(A)%20ALLIED%20C-IED%20MAR%2011.pdf?Ver=2017-03-10-
134619-480. 
44. Paul Oling, Martijn van Latum & Jasmijn Motshagen, Rapid-DNA Denies Anonymity: 
It Takes a Network to Take Down a Network, http://oling.org/APA_Rapid-DNA_ENG.pdf 











person is detained with a high degree of certainty.45 It can help ensure an up-
to-date and complete account of detainees being held. This is why it is in-
creasingly being used for this purpose by armed forces. Doctrine for U.S. 
armed forces on detainee operations states that “biometric samples and as-
sociated data will be collected and recorded on each detainee captured and 
detained by the Armed Forces of the United States.”46   
(vi) Identifying dead persons who fall into the hands of a party to an 
armed conflict: When a person dies, there is a limited time during which their 
biometric data can be enrolled. For example, it has been reported that iris 
and fingerprint biometric data can be obtained for up to four days postmor-
tem in warmer seasons and fifty or more days in the winter.47 This means 
that the individual’s biometric characteristics can be used to identify them 
during that period. Being able to identify dead persons is of importance to 
parties to an armed conflict, inter alia, because of obligations under IHL or 
because of operational requirements.48 An example of the latter is the use of 
DNA analysis and biometrics by the U.S. special forces that killed Osama 
bin Laden to verify his identity.49 Similarly, after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was 
killed in October 2019, a DNA sample was taken from his remains. Rapid 
analysis resulted in a match with a sample taken from al-Baghdadi at a de-
tention center in 2004.50 
  
IV. THE DUTY TO REVIEW NEW WEAPONS  
 
Under IHL, States have an obligation to review new weapons before they 
are employed. Article 36 AP I provides,  
  
 
45. BUHROW, supra note 14, at 58–61. 
46. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-63, Detainee Operations III-5 (2014), 
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_63.pdf [hereinafter JP 
3-63]. 
47. Kelly Sauerwein, Tiffany Saul, Dawnie Steadman & Chris Boehnen, The Effect of 
Decomposition on the Efficacy of Biometrics for Positive Identification, 62 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCI-
ENCES 1599 (2016). 
48. For discussion of legal obligations in this regard, see infra Part VII. 
49. Madison Park & Sabriya Rice, How Did the U.S. Confirm the Body Was bin Laden’s? 
CNN (May 3, 2011), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/05/02/bin.laden.body.id/ 
index.html. 
50. Jim Garamone, Central Command Chief Gives Details on Baghdadi Raid, U.S. 












In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, 
means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obliga-
tion to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circum-
stances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international 
law applicable to the High Contracting Party.51 
 
It is controversial whether this obligation or a similar obligation also ap-
plies as a rule of customary international law. It is notable that the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) customary law study52 does not 
contain a rule on weapons reviews. But the guide that the ICRC has drawn 
up for the implementation of Article 36 states that “[t]he requirement that 
the legality of all new weapons, means and methods of warfare be systemat-
ically assessed is arguably one that applies to all States, regardless of whether 
or not they are party to Additional Protocol I.”53 According to the guide, this 
flows logically from the truism that States are prohibited from using illegal 
weapons and means and methods of warfare or from using weapons and 
means and methods of warfare in an illegal manner.54 The view that the ob-
ligation is part of customary IHL also finds support among some commen-
tators.55 Others are more uncertain or conclude that there is no such obliga-
tion under customary IHL.56  
 
51. Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 36. 
52. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & 
Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter ICRC CUSTOMARY LAW STUDY]. 
53. International Committee of the Red Cross, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weap-
ons, Methods and Means of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977, 
88 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 931, 933 (2006). 
54. Id.  
55. See, e.g., Chairperson of the Informal Meeting of Experts, Report of the 2016 Infor-
mal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS): Advanced Ver-
sion ¶ 50, https://docs-library.unoda.org/Convention_on_Certain_Conventional_ Weap-
ons_-_Informal_Meeting_of_Experts_(2016)/ReportLAWS_2016_AdvancedVersion.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2021) (noting that several delegations found that weapons reviews are 
an obligation under customary law); see also Michael N. Schmitt, Foreword to CYBERWAR: 
LAW AND ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL CONFLICTS, at v–vi (Jens David Ohlin, Kevin Govern & 
Claire Finkelstein eds., 2015) (“This provision [Article 36] generally reflects customary law, 
and thus binds all states irrespective of party status.”); Jean-Marie Henckaerts, The Develop-
ment of International Humanitarian Law, in THE LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE 117, 
128 (Howard M. Hensel ed., 2008). 
56. See, e.g., Natalia Jevglevskaja, Weapons Review Obligation under Customary International 
Law, 94 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 186, 220 (2018) (“the weapons review obligation 











The duty to review in Article 36 AP I, and a similar obligation under 
customary law to the extent that it exists, raises the question of whether bi-
ometric technology qualifies as a “weapon, means or method.” If the answer 
to that question is in the affirmative, then the question of whether it is new 
must be answered, in which case it is subject to the obligation to review.  
IHL instruments do not contain a definition of “weapon” or “means or 
method of warfare.” Weapon has been defined elsewhere as “a means of 
warfare used in combat operations, including a gun, missile, bomb or other 
munitions, that is capable of causing either (i) injury to, or death, of persons; 
or (ii) damage to, or destruction of, objects.”57  
Means of warfare have been described as comprising weapons, weapon 
systems, or platforms employed for the purposes of attack, and methods of 
warfare as activities designed adversely to affect the enemy’s military opera-
tions or military capacity.58 Method of warfare has also been described as 
referring to tactics, techniques, and procedures by which hostilities are con-
ducted,59 or as referring to any particular manner of using weapons or of 
otherwise conducting hostilities, irrespective of permissibility or appropri-
ateness, and ranging from the use of emblems, flags, uniforms, and weapons 
or other equipment to the choice of targets for attack.60 
Taking these definitions as a starting point, it appears that biometrics is 
not a weapon or other means of warfare. Biometrics in itself is not capable 
of causing injury, death, damage, or destruction. Biometrics is also not a 
weapons system or platform and is not employed for the purposes of attack 
as a means in itself but only in support of attacks by other means. Arguably, 
biometrics also does not constitute a method of warfare. It is not a manner 
of using a weapon or otherwise conducting hostilities, although its use can, 
if applied in particular ways, support the use of weapons. This conclusion is 
supported by the fact that, as far as the author is aware, no State has con-
ducted legal reviews of biometrics based on Article 36 of AP I. However, 
 
57. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD 
UNIVERSITY, MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WAR-
FARE ¶ 1(ff) (2009). 
58. Bill Boothby, How Will Weapons Reviews Address the Challenges Posed by New Technologies, 
52 MILITARY LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR REVIEW 37, 40 (2013). 
59. Michael. N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: 
A Reply to the Critics, 4 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 1, 27 (2013). 
60. Gloria Gaggioli & Nils Melzer, Methods of Warfare, in OXFORD GUIDE TO INTERNA-











new weapons or methods of warfare that are enhanced by biometrics would 




As became clear in Part III, biometrics can be used to support targeting de-
cisions.62 Targeting involving the use of biometrics must conform to the 
rules applicable to the conduct of hostilities. Those rules notably include the 
principles of distinction and precautions.63 
The principle of distinction requires that a distinction be made between 
civilians on the one hand and combatants on the other hand. Civilians may 
not be the object of an attack, except civilians who directly participate in 
hostilities. In case of doubt as to whether a person is a civilian, that person 
must be considered a civilian.64 Not every level of doubt concerning the sta-
tus of a person precludes attack. The degree of doubt must be at a level that 
would cause a reasonable attacker in the same or similar circumstances to 
question the status of the person concerned.65    
The use of biometrics may facilitate observance of the principle of dis-
tinction.66 The technology cannot identify the status of persons under IHL 
as such, but it does contribute to confirming the identity of persons. Indi-
rectly, this may contribute to establishing the status of that person under 
IHL. For instance, this would be the case if a person’s identity is established 
through the use of remote biometrics and there is information that that par-
ticular person is a commander of an organized armed group. An example 
would be the use of voice recognition to identify a person remotely, where 
the person identified is known to be an enemy commander.67 
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In practice, biometrics is only useful in cases in which persons who are 
likely to be targeted have previously been enrolled. In such cases, there is a 
realistic possibility of a match, and thus of identifying the individual through 
the use of biometrics. At the moment, this means that this will be an option 
only in limited cases and for a limited number of armed forces.    
When using biometrics to support targeting, it is important to remember 
that the technology is not infallible. In addition, characteristics that could 
typically be used for remote use, such as facial recognition and gait, are re-
ported to be relatively indistinctive.68 Therefore, reliance on this technology 
alone to ensure respect for the principle of distinction may not be sufficient. 
The less reliable the use of technology under the circumstances concerned 
and the less certain that the identification is accurate means it is less likely 
that the threshold of doubt in Article 50 of AP I will be overcome.  
The principle of precautions requires that constant care shall be taken to 
spare the civilian population, civilians, and civilian objects.69 Article 57 of AP 
I contains a number of specific measures that must be taken to this end. The 
first is the obligation for those who plan or decide upon an attack to do 
everything feasible to verify that the objective to be attacked is not a civilian 
or civilian object. This obligation is closely linked to the principle of distinc-
tion.   
The word “feasible” is not defined in AP I but is generally understood 
to mean that which is practicable or practically possible, taking into account 
all circumstances prevailing at the time, including humanitarian and military 
considerations.70 What is practicable or practically possible will have to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. Many different circumstances may be 
relevant, including the means available to the attacker, whether those means 
are required elsewhere, the importance of the target, the urgency of the situ-
ation, and the characteristics of the target. The factors that are relevant will 
differ from attack to attack. In the case of biometrics, factors that might be 
relevant include whether the armed forces doing the targeting have a stand-
off biometrics capability available in theater, whether the capability is more 
urgently needed elsewhere, how quickly the system can be used in relation 
to how fleeting the targeting opportunity is, and how accurate the system is 
under the conditions at the time, such as dust, fog, heat, etc.  
A commander, in deciding whether to attack a particular objective, will 
have to take into account the information available to them at the time. 
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However, doing everything reasonably feasible must be understood to also 
require making a reasonable effort to discover pertinent information.71 This 
has been understood to mean that a commander is required to take all prac-
ticable steps to obtain the information necessary to make a good-faith as-
sessment.72  
According to William Boothby, doing everything feasible would defi-
nitely include obtaining all the reasonably available biometric data in order 
to verify that the intended human objective is, in fact, a lawful target.73 This, 
of course, presupposes that the armed forces doing the targeting have already 
undertaken biometric enrollment of persons in the area of operations. With-
out enrollment, obtaining biometric data of the intended target would be of 
no use because it could not be compared to other data. It also presupposes 
that the armed forces concerned are able to capture biometric data from a 
distance. It appears that such technology is already being put into service. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that at present there are few States, let alone orga-
nized armed groups, that possess such a capability. If they do, however, de-
pending on the circumstances, the principle of precaution may require them 
to use this capability.  
Boothby also states that doing everything feasible would likely include 
taking reasonably available steps to seek to verify that the sources of bio-
metric identification are reliable, that any associated equipment is working 
properly, and, if it can be done reasonably easily, checking that the biometric 
test results that are being used to inform targeting decisions have not been 
corrupted by, for instance, malfunction, interference, or spoofing.74  
  
VI. CAPTURE, DETENTION, AND PROSECUTION  
 
When a party to an armed conflict captures a person, that party will want to 
know who it has captured. If that party goes on to detain the person after 
capture, it will be all the more important for it to know who it is holding. 
Apart from practical considerations, the Geneva Conventions contain re-
quirements concerning the registration of persons who have been taken pris-
oner of war (POW) or interned as a civilian. Article 122 of the Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC III) requires a 
party to an international armed conflict (IAC) to establish an Information 
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Bureau for Prisoners of War.75 It must provide this bureau with certain in-
formation concerning the POW, as set out in paragraphs 4–6 of the Article. 
Article 136 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War (GC IV) also contains an obligation to establish an 
information bureau, which is responsible for receiving and transmitting in-
formation in respect of protected persons in the power of that party.76 Arti-
cle 138 provides that the information received by the national bureau shall 
be of such a character as to make it possible to identify the protected person 
exactly.77 It provides a non-exhaustive list of types of information that must 
be provided, including surname, first names, place and date of birth, nation-
ality, last residence, and distinguishing characteristics. The rationale behind 
these specific requirements is to ensure that no one goes missing or is forci-
bly disappeared.  
With regard to non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), the ICRC’s 
customary law study states that it is a rule of customary IHL in both IACs 
and NIACs that the personal details of persons deprived of their liberty must 
be recorded.78  
Although it is obvious that collecting biometric data may contribute to 
the purpose underlying these rules, these rules do not require such collection. 
The updated ICRC Commentary to GC III states that “Article 122 does not 
provide a basis to collect biological samples and the resulting DNA profiles 
from all prisoners of war; there must be a specific purpose for doing so.”79 
At the same time, the rules discussed above do not expressly prohibit the 
collection of biometric data from persons who have been captured. 
This raises the question of whether there are IHL provisions that do 
prohibit such collection.80 Two articles from the Geneva Conventions, in 
particular, merit further discussion in this regard. 
Article 17 of GC III provides that every POW, when questioned on the 
subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names, rank, date of birth, 
and army, regimental, personal, or serial number, or equivalent 
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information.81 The Article continues by stating that if a POW “willfully in-
fringes this rule,” the only possible sanction is a restriction of the privileges 
accorded to his rank or status.82 This means that other sanctions are not 
allowed. One possible view would be that compelling the POW to give in-
formation in the form of his biometric characteristics would be a sanction 
that is not allowed under Article 17. The updated Commentary to GC III can 
be read as supporting this view. The commentary to Article 17 only mentions 
the possibility of using biometrics in connection with the fifth paragraph of 
the Article.83 That paragraph provides that the identity of POWs who, “ow-
ing to their physical or mental condition, are unable to state their identity . . 
. . shall be established by all possible means.”84 This suggests biometrics may 
be used in the case of that particular category of POWs, but not when POWs 
are able to provide information concerning their identity but decline to do 
so. Such a view also seems to find support in the updated ICRC commentary 
to Article 16 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field (GC I), 
which will be discussed in more detail in Part VII below. For present pur-
poses, it suffices to note that it deals with recording and forwarding of in-
formation on each wounded, sick, or dead person of the adversary falling 
into the hands of an opposing belligerent. The Article does not contain an 
exhaustive list of information that may be recorded, and, in principle, bio-
metric data is therefore not excluded. The updated Commentary to GC I, how-
ever, states in respect specifically of DNA samples that these “may not be 
taken without the person’s consent, unless there is a legal justification, such 
as in the case of a criminal investigation, or to identify remains.”85 The Com-
mentary does not explain why this is the case, but it may be that the drafters 
considered that there was a link with Article 17 of GC III. After all, wounded 
or sick members of the armed forces who fall into the hands of the enemy 
are, in principle, POWs. It must be remembered, however, that the taking of 
a DNA sample requires taking body material, whether directly from the in-
dividual concerned or something that the person left behind. Other 
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biometric modalities, such as scanning the iris or voice recognition, do not 
require taking actual material. As a result, it can be argued that capturing such 
biometrics is less invasive than taking DNA. Such a view seems to be sup-
ported by the commentary to Article 16 of GC I, which states that “an indi-
vidual may be fingerprinted or photographed” without making any reference 
to the consent of the individual concerned.86 
Another view on the meaning of Article 17 of GC III is also possible. It 
can be argued that taking biometric data from a POW does not constitute a 
sanction. Under this view, the purpose of taking biometric data is not to 
punish a POW, but to make it possible to identify them through alternative 
means rather than having the POW provide the information. In this sense, 
the involuntary taking of biometric data would not constitute exposure to 
“unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment” in the sense of Article 17’s fourth 
paragraph.87 This would, in any case, apply to the capturing of biometric data 
in so far as it is done without physically restraining the POW or forcing him 
to adopt a certain position. As was discussed in Part II, there are possibilities 
for doing so. Even with respect to the capturing of biometric data while 
physically restraining the POW or forcing them to adopt a certain position, 
it can be argued that identification of the POW using such alternative means 
contributes to the objective underlying the obligation to register a POW: to 
ensure that no one goes missing or is forcibly disappeared. Thus, Article 17 
should not be read as prohibiting this.  
Article 31 of GC IV states that “No physical or moral coercion shall be 
exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from 
them or from third parties.”88 One interpretation of this rule would be that 
it prohibits compelling civilians to be biometrically enrolled. Under this view, 
taking their biometric data against their will would constitute coercion, and 
any biometric data obtained would constitute “information from them” in 
the sense of Article 31.89 In this case, however, another interpretation is pos-
sible. As the ICRC Commentary to Article 31 explains, the Article needs to be 
considered in light of other provisions of the Convention: 
 
It will then be seen that there is no question of absolute prohibition, as 
might be thought at first sight. The prohibition only applies in so far as the 
other provisions of the Convention do not implicitly or explicitly authorize 
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a resort to coercion. Thus, Article 31 is subject to the unspoken reservation 
that force is permitted whenever it is necessary to use it in the application 
of measures taken under the Convention.90 
 
The Commentary states that one of the exceptions to the general rule in 
Article 31 is “in regard to everything connected with internment.”91 On this 
basis, it could be argued that identifying an internee falls within the scope of 
“everything connected with internment” and that compelling a civilian in-
ternee to provide biometric data is allowed. 
Another relevant aspect in this regard is that the taking of biometric data 
can, in principle, be done without any coercion, even if it is involuntary. As 
was explained in Part II, biometric enrollment does not necessarily require 
physically restraining the person concerned. If moral coercion is understood 
to mean psychological pressure to compel the person concerned to cooper-
ate, this is also not necessarily required for biometric enrollment. In princi-
ple, this can be done without the cooperation of the person concerned, alt-
hough this will be more difficult. 
Article 27 of GC IV provides that “protected persons are entitled, in all 
circumstances, to respect for their persons.”92 According to the ICRC Com-
mentary, this covers “in particular the right to physical, moral and intellectual 
integrity.”93 If this right includes a right to privacy, the Article would limit 
the possibilities for biometric enrollment. However, this does not seem to 
be how it is interpreted.94 Separately, Article 27 states that the parties to the 
conflict “may take such measures of control and security in regard to pro-
tected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war.” One could argue 
that such measures may include biometric enrollment. However, this does 
not affect the obligation to respect the fundamental rights of protected per-
sons, which must be respected “in all circumstances,”95 as set out in the 
aforementioned Article. 
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There is some evidence in State practice to support the view that Articles 
17, 31, and 27 do not prohibit the involuntary taking of biometric data. For 
example, official United States doctrine on detention states, without making 
distinctions between categories of detained persons,  
 
Once the capture of individuals has occurred, the proper identification and 
classification of those personnel is critical to the overall intelligence and 
detainee operations effort. Rapid collection of biometrics information 
from detainees is critical to ensuring their prompt identification, and is a 
crucial step that must be conducted as soon as possible after detention.96  
 
Similarly, the Norwegian Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict provides that 
“Prisoners of war must be identified and registered as soon as possible. In 
order to determine the identity of prisoners, biometric data may be collected, 
including fingerprints, DNA, voice samples, iris scans, etc.”97  
It must be stressed that this article only discusses IHL and no other bod-
ies of law. It cannot be excluded that other bodies of law, such as human 
rights law and data protection law, will continue to apply during an armed 
conflict and will impose additional restrictions to those imposed by IHL.  
 
VII. THE MISSING AND THE DEAD 
 
The Geneva Conventions contain a number of provisions on the identifica-
tion of missing and dead persons. Article 16 of GC I and Article 19 of GC 
II provide that parties to a conflict must record any information which may 
assist in the identification of each dead person of the adverse Party falling 
into their hands.98 GCs III and IV also contain obligations to identify POWs 
and civilian internees who die.   
Article 33 of AP I requires that as soon as circumstances permit, and at 
the latest the end of active hostilities, each party to the conflict shall search 
for the persons who have been reported missing by an adverse party.99 Such 
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adverse party shall transmit all relevant information concerning such persons 
in order to facilitate such searches. Article 33(2)(b) requires parties to an 
armed conflict to facilitate and, if need be, carry out the search for and the 
recording of information concerning persons referred to in Article 33(1) if 
they have died as a result of hostilities or occupation outside of a situation 
of detention. 
According to the ICRC’s customary law study, it is a rule of customary 
IHL applicable in both IACs and NIACs that with a view to identification 
of the dead, each party to the conflict must record all available information 
prior to disposal of the body.100   
Biometrics may contribute to the aim of these IHL rules, namely the 
identification of the person concerned. Some of the articles mentioned 
above contain lists of information to be recorded. This is the case for Article 
16 of GC I, for example, which in its second paragraph includes a list of 
information that should be recorded if possible. This list does not contain 
biometric data, which is not surprising considering that this technology was 
not in use in 1949. This does not mean that biometric data is outside the 
scope of the Article. The updated ICRC Commentary states in this regard that: 
 
The guiding principle in this area is that as much information as possible 
that may assist in the identification of the . . . dead person is to be recorded. 
Accordingly, items or particulars that are not mentioned in the article, such 
as photographs, fingerprints, body measurements, names and addresses of 
next of kin, and distinguishing features or markings such as scars or tattoos, 
may be included in the record.101  
 
Biometric data would certainly be of a nature to assist in the identifica-
tion and must therefore be understood to be included. The Commentary sug-
gests that in the case of DNA samples, these may only be taken with the 
person’s consent.102 However, it then goes on to state that such consent is 
not required if there is a legal justification “such as in the case of a criminal 
investigation, or to identify remains.”103 Consequently, the taking of DNA 
samples to identify remains must be presumed to be permitted. This applies 
a fortiori to those biometric data that can be taken without taking physical 
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material from the body or even touching it. This is also supported by State 
practice.  
It must be underlined that if biometric data is taken from the dead, this 
must be done while taking into account IHL provisions on respect for the 
dead. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibits outrages 
upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.104 
This prohibition also applies to the dead,105 an interpretation that has been 
confirmed in several recent judgments of domestic courts in, inter alia, Ger-
many, Finland, and the Netherlands.106 According to the ICRC’s customary 
law study, the prohibition of mutilating dead bodies is a norm of customary 
IHL in both IACs and NIACs.107  
Arguably an example of a violation of this prohibition in the context of 
the collection of biometric data is provided by an incident involving Austral-
ian special forces in Afghanistan in 2013.108 During the fighting in the south-
ern province of Zabul, four insurgents were killed by these forces. A corporal 
in the Australian forces then severed a hand of one of the dead fighters with 
a scalpel. He repeated the process with two other fighters, cutting off their 
right hands. When questioned, the corporal stated that he had done this as 
there was time pressure to retrieve the biometric material and return to the 
helicopters for extraction.109  
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VIII. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH IHL 
 
The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols provide for a number of 
compliance mechanisms.110 Mechanisms that are not part of IHL treaty law 
also contribute to ensuring compliance. Biometrics potentially has an im-
portant role to play in various of these mechanisms. 
One important element in ensuring compliance is fact-finding.111 To en-
sure compliance with a body of law, fact-finding may require an investigation 
of the facts. Such an investigation aims to bring to light what actually hap-
pened, which in turn makes it possible to determine whether what happened 
conformed with the law. This is of particular importance in the case of IHL 
because much of what happens during an armed conflict may initially be 
obscured by the fog of war.  
The Geneva Conventions provide for the establishment of ad hoc fact-
finding commissions on the request of a party to the conflict. The relevant 
provisions allow for parties to have a neutral third State, most likely the Pro-
tecting Power, make an inquiry into alleged violations of the Conventions.112 
Additional Protocol I established a standing International Humanitarian 
Fact-finding Commission (IHFFC).113 In practice, neither the inquiry proce-
dure provided for in the Geneva Conventions nor the IHFFC has been used 
by parties to an armed conflict as envisaged. This does not mean that fact-
finding into alleged violations of IHL is not undertaken. In recent years, a 
number of ad hoc commissions of inquiry have been established to investi-
gate compliance with, inter alia, IHL. Many of these commissions were cre-
ated by the U.N. Human Rights Council.114 Biometric techniques could 
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contribute to fact-finding in armed conflicts, in particular by identifying vic-
tims of alleged IHL violations.115  
Individual criminal responsibility has taken on an increasingly important 
role in ensuring compliance with IHL. National courts play an essential role 
in enforcing IHL,116 both with regard to the conduct of a State’s own nation-
als and in conflicts for which the international community has not created 
an international court or tribunal or failed to provide the International Crim-
inal Court jurisdiction.117 The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol 
I require States Parties to criminalize so-called “grave breaches” of the Con-
ventions and the Protocol and to prosecute or extradite persons alleged to 
have committed such crimes.118 They must also take measures necessary for 
the suppression of all acts contrary to the Conventions other than grave 
breaches. This is understood to mean that States Parties are under an obli-
gation to address such acts, and it is implied that they may take a wide range 
of measures to do so.119 One possible measure is to take judicial action.120 
Although treaty law on NIACs contains no provisions on criminal prosecu-
tion for war crimes, it is now generally accepted that war crimes can also be 
committed in NIACs.121 According to the ICRC’s customary law study, it is 
a rule of customary IHL in both IACs and NIACs that States must investi-
gate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or armed forces or on 
their territory, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects.122 They must also 
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investigate other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction and, if appro-
priate, prosecute the suspects.123 
In the last decades, a number of international courts and tribunals have 
been established for the purpose of trying persons accused of international 
crimes, including war crimes.124 These include the ad hoc tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as the International Criminal Court.  
The initial development of biometrics was closely connected to the crim-
inal justice process. Therefore, it could be expected that the technology also 
plays a role in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes at the national 
and international levels. War crimes can be very difficult to prosecute. Bio-
metric data can be an invaluable asset during investigation and trial. It can 
enable identifying victims, possibly establishing that war crimes were com-
mitted. Biometric information can also assist in identifying war crimes sus-
pects and, in some cases, linking them to a particular crime or crime scene. 
This is not without challenges, however, because in many cases no infor-
mation is collected at the crime scene. In other cases, the persons being pros-
ecuted were not present at the actual scene of the crime (particularly in lead-
ership cases). It appears that in practice, limited use has so far been made of 
biometrics in war crimes investigations and prosecutions. Although biomet-
rics are used in an increasing number of domestic criminal systems, there is 
very little evidence of its use in war crimes cases.125 There is also little infor-
mation on the use of biometrics by international courts and tribunals. 
There are some notable domestic cases of the use of biometrics, how-
ever. Biometrics has played a prominent role in the conviction of Taliban 
fighters before Afghan courts. Evidence based on biometrics was collected 
by international forces in Afghanistan and handed over to Afghan authorities 
for use in criminal prosecution as part of evidence packages.126 This was par-
ticularly the case in the National Security Court at the Justice Center in Par-
wan (JCIP), an Afghan court supported by foreign advisors.127 In January 
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2014, it was reported that “the use of biometrics in prosecutions at JCIP now 
plays a prominent role in the convictions of those individuals who have been 
so matched to criminal offenses.”128 This does not seem to have been the 
case for courts in Afghanistan more generally, however.129 
A war crimes case in which biometrics played an important role was that 
of U.S. Army Lieutenant Clint Lorance. Lorance was tried by court-martial 
for allegedly ordering his platoon to fire on unarmed villagers in Afghanistan 
in July 2012, killing two men.130 Following these deaths, Lorance claimed 
that he was not able to complete a proper battle damage assessment on the 
men because other villagers had already taken away their bodies. A member 
of Lorance’s platoon subsequently reported him to military authorities. Lo-
rance was convicted at a general court-martial of second-degree murder and 
sentenced to nineteen years of confinement. Lorance was pardoned by Pres-
ident Trump in 2019.131 Biometrics played an important role in obtaining this 
pardon.132 Lorance’s defense team argued that biometric data established 
that the Afghan men killed were Taliban bomb makers, not civilians. How-
ever, it has been claimed that the data was wrong and did not actually prove 
this.133 
The latter example demonstrates that the use of biometrics in the context 
of criminal investigations and prosecutions, including in war crimes cases, is 
not a panacea. As discussed in Part II, biometrics as a technology is not in-
fallible. Perhaps more importantly, biometrics is a technology that is used by 
humans. How accurate findings based on the technology are, is, therefore, 
 
128. David Pendall & Cal Sieg, Biometric-Enabled Intelligence in Regional Command-East, 72 




130. United States v. Lorance, No. 20130679, 2017 WL 2819756, at *1–2 (A. Ct. Crim. 
App. June 27, 2017), rev. denied, 77 M.J. 136 (C.A.A.F. 2017).  
131. Jean Galbraith, Issuing Several Pardons, President Trump Intervenes in Proceedings of U.S. 
Troops Charged or Convicted of Acts Amounting to War Crimes, 114 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 307 (2019). 
132. Jim Nash, Misuse of Biometric System Won Accused U.S. War Criminal a Presidential 
Pardon—Report, BIOMETRIC UPDATE.COM (Jan. 18, 2021), https://www.bio-
metricupdate.com/202101/misuse-of-biometric-system-won-accused-u-s-war-criminal-a-
presidential-pardon-report. 











dependent on the use or misuse of the technology by humans. Those hu-




Biometrics is being used by armed forces during armed conflict and, given 
its advantages, is likely to be adopted on an even larger scale in the future. 
As was discussed in Part III, biometric techniques are relevant to a wide 
variety of military activities, including activities that are part of armed con-
flict.135 These activities range from access control to military facilities to iden-
tifying the deceased. IHL contains no rules that expressly regulate the use of 
biometrics. This is unsurprising since biometrics, as defined in this article, 
did not exist when the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I were 
drafted. This article has demonstrated that there are, nevertheless, IHL rules 
regulating certain activities that are relevant to the use of biometrics. Indeed, 
it is generally recognized that IHL applies in principle to new technologies 
developed after the adoption of the IHL rules concerned. In the case of bi-
ometrics, this article has shown that IHL rules may require the use of bio-
metrics under certain circumstances and that, in other circumstances, IHL 
rules may limit the use of biometrics. The article also made clear that the 
application of certain rules of IHL to biometrics raises questions of interpre-
tation. A case in point is Article 17 of GC III and Article 31 of GC IV, 
discussed in Part VI. Different interpretations of these articles appear de-
fendable, with important differences in outcome for the permissibility of bi-
ometrics.    
Such cases raise the question of whether new law is needed to regulate 
the use of biometrics during armed conflict. It is submitted that it is too early 
to answer this question in the affirmative. This is because there appears to 
have been very little discussion among States so far on the application of 
IHL to biometrics. Such discussion is arguably a necessary step before de-
termining whether new rules are required or whether clarification of the law 
will suffice. If the outcome of such a discussion is that new rules are required, 
it can also inform the content of new rules to be proposed. In any event, the 
statement made in 2012 that States are likely unwilling, at this stage, to create 
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an international treaty on the collection of battlefield biometrics, let alone 
biometrics writ large, seems to still apply.136   
What seems most urgently required at this point in time is for an inter-
national debate on a legal framework for the use of biometrics during armed 
conflict to be initiated. Such a debate would not only focus on IHL but also 
take into account other relevant fields of international law, notably interna-
tional human rights law. It appears that in recent years some discussion on 
the legal framework for the use of biometrics during military operations has 
already taken place, but this has been only between certain States and limited 
in scope. The initiative for such a broader discussion could be taken by one 
or more States or even by the ICRC.  
Such discussion could also be part of an exercise to develop best prac-
tices for the use of biometrics during armed conflict. The drafting of a doc-
ument with non-binding “best practices” or guidelines on the use of biomet-
rics has been suggested in the past. Such an effort could be a first step to-
wards creating new international legal norms.137 
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